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Abstract The purpose of this article is to demonstrate,
based on an extensive study of the Shell-led Camisea gas
project in Peru, how what we believe to be a new approach
to dealing with stakeholders, focusing on sense-making and
combining industry dynamics and stakeholder empower-
ment, was developed. The project’s success was measured
by the fact that, unlike similar projects around the world, it
did not meet with major opposition during its 4-year life
span. Those involved in the Camisea project succeeded in
creating an open approach to building stakeholder rela-
tionships, allowing them to navigate through a number of
diverse and challenging socio-political and ecological
issues. An integral part of Shell’s approach was acting
upon its commitment to high standards of operation and
values. The insights from this case clearly indicate that
stakeholder management and theorizing can profit from a
less controlled, open and sense-making oriented strategiz-
ing with stakeholders.
Keywords Stakeholder relations  Stakeholder
engagement  Strategizing
Introduction
The Camisea project, which we will present in this article,
is a good example of how Shell managed the pressure
created by increased public scrutiny and redefined its role
in relation to adopting a more accountable and responsible
approach to its gas exploration and production. The
Camisea region, in which Shell’s exploration activities
took place, was both environmentally and socially sensi-
tive. These factors created abundant issues that were sub-
sumed under the question of how to develop the expected
gas reserves in a manner that also supported a sustainable
development of the Camisea region.
Nowadays, it is expected from companies starting pro-
jects of this scale to enter into an engagement process with
their stakeholders. The hope is that projects like Camisea
can be developed in concert with stakeholders and under the
label of creating more stakeholder democracy in the sense of
more self-governance and voluntarism (Matten and Crane
2005b). Democratic processes can produce a more partici-
patory environment and can lead to shared responsibility and
commitment. Implementing stakeholder engagements in
practice, however, pose additional challenges for all
involved; their potential to contribute to value creation both
on the side of the company and the stakeholders is ambiv-
alent (e.g. Bendell 2000, and for the oil industry, Idemudia
2009). In a better case, engagements can lead to shared
responsibility, innovation and learning. The downsides,
however, can be more stereotyping, more campaigning,
more conflict, and in the worst case, lead to even more
marginalization of local communities, for example.
Engaging with stakeholders means entering into a
journey, the outcome of which is to a certain extent open,
especially in situations that can be termed ‘wicked’ issues
(Camillus 2008). These imply problems that reflect the
characteristics of green-fields. They are complex, interde-
pendent, with far reaching consequences for which there
are no off-the shelf solutions. Furthermore, they interlink
stakeholder groups who would otherwise not traditionally
come together and require buy-in, the sharing of expertise
as well as the competence and willingness to actually work
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together. Camisea exemplifies the aggravation of some of
these characteristics, as the stakeholder environment of this
project was quite dynamic, geographically dispersed, and
the stakeholders involved were very diverse; this resulted
in making it difficult for Shell to approach the Camisea
stakeholders.
The goal of this article is to give a descriptive account of
the Camisea case to show what it means for a company to
enter into an open journey, which has potential deviations.
It asks the question: what can be deemed to be an adequate
form of strategizing in such a situation, which to a great
extent is obstructive to a classical stakeholder management
technique? This article postulates that the principle is to
accept the risks of a less ordered and structured manage-
ment approach in favour of implementing an open process
which allows for sense-making, shared learning and shared
power (Bryson and Crosby 1992).
The article will proceed as follows. It will provide a
short introduction to the Camisea case and describe the
nature of the issues with which Shell and its stakeholders
had to deal. Secondly, it will briefly make reference to the
analytical lenses used to study the Camisea case and the
methodology applied in conducting the study. Thirdly, it
will outline the new management scheme implemented by
Shell. To impart an account of the principles, which should
guide such an engagement, we will call this scheme ‘open
strategizing’. Finally, the article will critically discuss in
the conclusion the case’s contribution to theorizing about
stakeholders and conducting engagements in practice.
The Camisea Case
The Camisea project, which provides us with a case for
discussion, was a green field development conducted by
Shell and was named after the region in which the opera-
tions took place. The project started in 1994 and ended in
1998 when Shell withdrew its activities there.
In 1994, Shell and Perupetro, Peru’s government agency
responsible for hydrocarbons, agreed to a new evaluation
of the commercial potential of Camisea’s gas fields
(Anonymous 1994; May et al. 1999), as Peru was in des-
perate need of foreign capital and trade to stimulate its
development. Shell Explorada y Productora del Peru BV
(SEPP) discovered large reserves of non-associated natural
gas in the 80s and had at that time invested about 250
million US dollars in exploration.
At the time of Shell’s earlier operations in Peru during the
80s, no legislation or policies with respect to hydrocarbon
exploitation, environmental protection or the protection of
indigenous people existed. Shell’s activities, similar to those
of many other companies in other parts of the Amazon basin
and elsewhere in the world, had resulted in disruptions both
in the ecological and social environments, including defor-
estation, pollution of the natural environment, disturbance of
communal lands and the introduction and spread of diseases
among the local communities. As the company had been
unable to reach an agreement with the authorities, it relin-
quished the fields in 1989, due to the lack of marketing
prospects, the possibility of increasing critique related to its
operations and the government’s attitude of nationalizing
the property of foreign companies (e.g. May et al. 1999; Post
et al. 2002; Rozas 1997).
Under such circumstances which were connected to the
region’s sensitivity, the downsides of the earlier operations
mentioned above and, as a result of a 2-year period of
preliminary investigations between 1994 and 1996, it
became obvious to Shell that the project would also need
the support of a great variety of stakeholder groups, who
had vested interests in the area.
Developing the Camisea fields was an extremely sensi-
tive undertaking. The area lies in the upper Amazonian
region of Peru, situated approximately 500 km east of
Lima across the Andes in the Ucayali River Basin in the
area of Cusco. The region is known as the Lower Uru-
bamba (where the Urubamba River flows into the Ucayali
river), and it borders the Manu national park, the largest
area of undisturbed cloud forest in the world. It is rich in
biodiversity and home to a number of indigenous people,
primarily the Machiguenga. The Camisea area is also close
to the Apurimac Reserved Zone, covering an area of
1,669,300 ha and contains a similar range of biodiversity
as Manu. Apart from the national importance of developing
the gas reserves, the location of the Camisea area and the
pipeline alone made it obvious that the project posed
weighty environmental and societal considerations.
The Camisea project was finally stopped in the summer
of 1998 after an extension of the initial license agreement,
which had been signed in 1996. This, however, was not due
to negative exposure vis-a`-vis the national and interna-
tional stakeholder community. In fact, the company suc-
ceeded with its stakeholder consultation program in that it
received support from a majority of stakeholder groups,
and most notably from its primary stakeholders, the com-
munities. Even critical NGOs who generally objected to
exploration in such sensitive areas as Camisea acknowl-
edged that Shell had at least tried to do a good job.
The type of problems related to Camisea and, in the
wider sense to sustainability, can be termed ‘wicked’ issues
(e.g. Bryson and Crosby 1992; Camillus 2008). They are
likely to have very long-term, unforeseeable consequences
that go beyond a single project, region or time. Unfore-
seeable, because the problem itself is not yet well under-
stood, measures are unclear and due to the practical
impossibility of being able to make judgements about the
risks involved by operations in such sensitive environments
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or the likelihood that they may even occur. The Camisea
project could not be seen to be a venture under the control
of a single company, nor of any of the other participating
stakeholders. More exactly, dealing with the issue implied
sharing power among the parties involved and required a
solution process rather than a one-shot solution (Bryson
and Crosby 1992). This was from Shell’s point of view an
adequate management approach for the Camisea project.
Analytical Lenses
We have used the Actor-Network Theory (Callon 1980,
1986; Harrisson and Laberge 2002) and Strauss’ Negoti-
ated Order Theory (Strauss 1978, 1988, 1993; Strauss et al.
1991) as analytical lenses. These theories were applied as
they drew our analysis to the following points: both theo-
ries are constructivist in nature and preoccupied with
sense-making activities. Furthermore, they stress the
importance of dynamics and the provisional character of
orders, and draw our attention to negotiation, which is a
core activity in need of consideration.
Strauss’ theory, especially his concepts of social worlds
and arenas, describe how the parties involved fight out
interests and definitions of reality. Social worlds are the
more enduring aspects of situations which are expressed in
terms of the ideologies, values, practices, etc., and which
the members of a given world share. They influence their
members, who are socialized in the respective social
worlds and thus also limit their range of activities. In
arenas, members of different social worlds come together
to negotiate certain issues. Arenas are the more immediate
contexts influencing interactions and are especially inter-
esting in analyzing stakeholder engagements. Arenas can
be formal but are more likely to be informal. In arenas, the
stakeholders implement their strategies, which are directed
at pushing through their claims and interests. The Negoti-
ated Order Theory provides us with an understanding of the
basic structure for the evolution of negotiated orders and
thus also what we postulated would occur in the Camisea
case. Understandings, agreements, rules and so forth have
only temporal character; they need to be constantly worked
on. Furthermore, they can be reviewed and renewed on a
day-to-day basis but also within a framework of more long-
term assessments of the status quo. Any interruptions
impacting the negotiated order, such as, for example, new
stakeholders, can break a negotiated order and result in
new negotiations being necessary.
Actor-Network Theory, on the other hand, draws our
attention to how the different stakeholders act as entre-
preneurs in defining reality, selling or trying to impose
their view of the world on to others. It provides us with a
lens to more accurately identify the strategies the
stakeholders use. The basic process through which a shared
understanding is created is called ‘translation’, which
denotes a dynamic process in which the identity of the
involved actors, the possibility of interaction and the scope
of agency are negotiated and aligned (Callon 1986). The
process follows successive stages (Callon 1980) and, if it is
successful, may end with other actors accepting those
definitions of reality. Any of the actors involved in trans-
lation may put his vision through and also gain the support
of other stakeholders for their project. Therefore, if we look
at the Camisea case, we are aware that an actor-like Shell
might be a successful Callonian entrepreneur who can
attract stakeholders to its project, but this status is neither
guaranteed nor can it be taken for granted.
Therefore, both analytical lenses, Negotiated Order
Theory and Actor-Network Theory, make us look for actual
strategies that were applied and the reasons as to why Shell
was able to do so. Both theories make us aware that
engagements cannot be controlled, and if ever, we have to
look for how lasting any of the arrangements are. Every-
thing is basically uncertain and reversible, and order and
stability is more the exception than the rule (Callon 1986).
Methodology for the Study Conducted
Our study was an exploratory qualitative case study that
followed an inductive strategy. The purpose of this com-
bination was to inquire into a field that was not yet well
developed (Yin 2008). This aimed at discovering the
strategies used by one of the actors—in this case Shell—in
dealing with the challenges mentioned in the previous
section. We conducted a preliminary theorizing about how
companies may deal with ‘wicked’ issue situations when
the stakeholder environment is dispersed and fluid (Ei-
senhardt 1989). The study’s methodology made reference
to the grounded-theory approach (Strauss and Corbin
1990); its intent was to generate narrative statements
relating to the phenomenon under study.
The methodological aspects can be outlined as follows:
the Shell case was chosen on the grounds of a purposeful
sampling strategy (Patton 2002). It provided us with an
example for successfully dealing with a ‘wicked’ issue
situation, in the sense that the project did not face major
opposition during its life span. Data collection was based
on interview data gathered from semi-structured interviews
with both the Shell management in charge of Camisea and
a selected set of stakeholders.1 To reduce the likelihood of
misinterpretation, data collection was also based on
1 Shell as well as the stakeholders interrogated have been providing
the data for the study. All analysis and conclusions are the author’s
responsibility.
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secondary data, including historical as well as contempo-
rary information. Secondary data comprised archival data,
internal corporate documents, media releases and Internet
sources. The data analysis was organized along the process
of Shell’s engagement. The focus was on the strategies
Shell used in each of these phases and whether or not they
were used with a different emphasis. We also looked for
justifications for these strategies, both from Shell’s side and
also from the perspective of the stakeholders who were
interviewed. Data analysis was performed according to the
common procedures of inductive research and with the
support of a computer tool called ATLAS/ti.
The Camisea Case and Open Strategizing
At the time of signing the license agreement, Shell had not
only a fairly good understanding of the issues it was likely
to face, but it had developed a very far-reaching stake-
holder consultation process to provide the framework for
negotiating with the government, as well as with other
interested parties, on both national and international levels.
• It had to develop a clear understanding of its respon-
sibilities and disassociate itself from any policy to open
up the region for colonization.
• It had to secure the interests of the local indigenous
people, to ensure that they were not exploited and that
their rights and culture were protected.
• It had to develop clear environmental guidelines and
policies, not only as to how they could develop
measures against environmental impacts, but especially
in relation to how it would deal with Manu National
Park and the Apurimac Reserved Zone.
Due to its unfortunate past in the region during the 80s,
Shell had made the decision to maintain an open and
transparent process of participation even before the dis-
posal of the Brent Spar storage buoy became imminent or
the problems in Nigeria were elevated to a high profile
(Jones 1997).
These problem areas called for the support of a diverse
stakeholder environment that was difficult to involve for
different reasons: first, it was under-organized and thus
formalizing interactions was difficult if not, in certain
respects, counterproductive. Second, there were stake-
holder groups with different levels of expertise. Interaction
therefore had to be sensitive and open to this diversity, and
supportive of different forms of working together. Finally,
the geographical dispersion of the groups involved and the
sheer number of the stakeholder groups further aggravated
the situation.
Taking into account the specifics of this stakeholder
environment, we would like to demonstrate that many of
the strategies Shell used were counterintuitive to what we
have until now learned from classical stakeholder theory.
Many of the strategies used added up to what we would call
a very open form of strategizing, which we believe can
influence discretion in any other ‘wicked’ issue situation.
In applying our analytical lens to the case, we found
strategies that will be explained in more detail below.
Co-Construction
Issue framing—or co-construction—is a vital task when
dealing with ‘wicked’ issues since the way an issue is
framed has a considerable impact both on the stakeholders
around it and their perceptions of the meaning of the pro-
posed solutions (Bryson and Crosby 1992).
Now, the funny thing was that the workshop facili-
tator asked stakeholders to get people going, you
know, kind of, ‘this project is seen as a 40-year
project’. It would probably be longer than that, but
you know, if it was seen as a 40-year project, what
would their wishes for the region be in 40 years time.
Well, the environment remains intact, if you like, the
communities have reached a level of development
that they would want but do not feel imposed upon by
externals. It was basically about sustainable devel-
opment. So in the debate the facilitator got people to
do a mind map on the wall. And funnily enough, the
mind maps, I think between all the workshops, were
quite consistent. (Interview with B, February 1999)
As all of the co-construction activities took place in the
light of a demanding project, touching also some of the
more fundamental values, co-construction was always a
matter of identity preservation and enrolling in a shared
understanding of the situation (Harrisson and Laberge
2002). Of course, there were rival interpretations of what
Camisea should be, and they remained throughout the
project but did not touch the engagement process funda-
mentally. It appeared important, however, that these dif-
ferences were treated in a respectful manner and that they
remained on the radar throughout the process. As the above
citation indicates, there was relatively quickly a more or
less consistent framing of what the Camisea project should
be, and the framing could be successfully maintained.
Related to co-construction, we have identified the fol-
lowing sub-strategies: listening and learning, and
empowerment.
Co-construction implied that rather than proceeding
with speed and reducing complexity, which would pertain
to a management logic, stakeholder needs needed to be
fully understood even if this required time. This was vital
because in the case of a ‘wicked’ issue, none of the parties
involved has the knowledge to resolve it on its own. So,
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rather than following cost-benefit considerations to con-
clude the project quickly, it was about gaining informa-
tional richness. Shell thus started relatively early to
intensely listen to any concerns. The primary value of this
was that—even though resource intensive—listening and
learning generated new ideas and new ways of approaching
the case.
We didn’t have all the answers, you know, we just
didn’t have all the answers. And I think there isn’t
anything wrong with stopping there and saying, ‘We
don’t have all the answers. Can you help us?’ And I
think that changed the dynamic. You’ve seen the
thing and you decide on the project, you announce the
project and then you defend it. (Interview with B,
February 1999)
The second sub-strategy related to co-construction rela-
ted to empowerment. Regarding the diversity of stake-
holders, not only in terms of their institutional forms, but
also in terms of the level of expertise, empowerment was a
vital element. Projects in the oil and gas industry presup-
pose a general technical literacy to participate in consulta-
tion, but also literacy in other respects, i.e. in questions of
sustainable development, environmental questions, legal
questions, intercultural questions and so forth. We found,
for example, that even some of the environmental groups
had difficulties following the technical terms of an envi-
ronmental impact assessment, let alone lay groups.
Shell and Mobil would come and say, ‘Well, these
plans are out there for review three months, 45 days,
whatever. Everybody can make comments. But we’re
not getting any comments. How do we interpret that?
Does that mean that all these stakeholders are happy,
that this is a good plan? Or what does it mean?’ And of
course it didn’t mean that. What it meant was that
despite the fact that there’s publicity on these things, a
lot of people didn’t know about it. The other thing was
that even if you know about it, you get this huge impact
assessment and management plan for the area. But it
required a lot of technical knowledge to judge whether
it’s good or bad or whether it is deficient or whatever it
might be. (Interview with C, October 1999)
The communities and other relevant stakeholders were a
critical mass who needed to be enabled to participate in
interactions. Nevertheless, if they were unable to develop
the necessary capacities, it would threaten the sustainabil-
ity venture as a whole (Callon 1986). Furthermore, stake-
holders could only participate if the resources were
available, and some also needed empowerment in this
respect. Empowerment and capacity building is a multi-
dimensional social process that needs to be defined toge-
ther and helps people to engage in self-defined action (Page
and Czuba 1999; Schwerin 1995). Hence, what we could
primarily see develop in the Camisea case was that the
company started to effectively and increasingly act as a
facilitator to help build and open networks to the players
who could provide the necessary empowerment (e.g.
Ramiller 2005). It was important for the company to
identify adequate institutions or individuals who possessed
the right qualities, capabilities and operational approaches
to successfully provide the basis for capacity building and
empowerment.
Shaping Arenas
Arenas can be understood as areas of dispute, rather than
simple geographical locations, where the stakeholders
come together to debate, negotiate, fight-out, force or
manipulate issues (Strauss 1978). A practical example for a
more formal arena is a roundtable, but also virtual dis-
cussion forums may be considered as an arena. We will
first start with describing two sub-strategies, which we
believe belong together and should be subsumed under the
overarching term. They are called setting the criteria for the
process and structuring.
The first of the sub-strategies is related to setting a
number of criteria under which the process of engagement
should take place and also under what rules of the game the
parties are going to meet in the various arenas. Shell set up
criteria for a process to which it adhered to itself. It
expected this commitment would bear unforeseeable out-
comes, but it intended to remain open, permanent and
transparent to all the parties involved.
Yes, OK, it emerged, that is what I am saying, these
things began to emerge in terms of saying it is one
thing to say you must consult, which is sort of the by-
line, and then to say now what are we going to do in
this place. And so it happened as it happened, it
emerged as we went along. We didn’t have a clear
pathway through this except to set maybe some very,
very key principles at the beginning and virtually one
of the earliest things we kept saying to ourselves and
to each other was that we have to be open and
transparent. That became kind of a theme, an
underlying core theme, to anything and which we did.
And that kind of dictated when you got into a sce-
nario that said should we go this way or that way or
which was the way that was open and transparent, so
you could test it against a certain principle. (Interview
with A, March 1999)
The second sub-strategy related to the first, but with a
different emphasis. It is called structuring, which comprises
of finding ways to structure a process which is not man-
ageable in the classical sense (Callon 1986). The most
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prominent among the devices that structured the process
was the adaptive environmental impact assessment which
was an integral component of the Camisea project, but there
were also the briefing papers, reports, studies, etc., which
served as a means to solidify the system of interactions with
reliability. They are more suitable for ‘wicked’ issue set-
tings that call for adaptive and flexible forms of ordering
than other more formal forms of ordering (Law 1992).
I think another thing is being able to provide multiple
media for the message, the website, full documenta-
tion, summary reports, briefing papers, meetings,
workshops, you need a range of approaches. I think
we learned that it is a process, it is not an event so
that you have to start being engaged and then you
have to be willing not only to work at your pace but
also at the pace and the desire of the people you are
talking to, so that you don’t say we are having an
open house next week and after the open house we
will sign a contract, that is insufficient, of course.
(Interview with A, March 1999)
We believe that in dealing with ‘wicked’ issue settings
and with a great variety of stakeholders, being skilful in
designing and using arenas is decisive to successful strate-
gizing. It is to some extent a material matter of creating the
measures named above, ordering them adequately and
linking them with the actors involved so that they allow for
co-construction and self-organization and further adaptation
to outside dynamics. Furthermore, the arenas should be
created such that no relevant party is closed out. The tech-
nical protocols, workshops, documents, impact assessments,
all contribute to the patterning of the relations with the
stakeholders, but only when these single elements are com-
bined in a meaningful and supportive manner (Callon 1992).
Shaping arenas is an interactive process. If they are
defined, one also has to be aware that arenas can develop
different dynamics, which need to be considered. What
were the reasons for focusing on arenas? It provided Shell
with an opportunity to contribute to a process, which
necessitated openness in terms of content but was not fully
manageable. None of the stakeholders who participated on
the level of an informed consent would agree that they
were forced into opinion-building that was predefined.
Rather, in providing the stakeholders with an open texture
for interaction, Shell was able to build relations with their
stakeholders, even when they were adverse, that lasted
longer than the Camisea project.
Credibility
Credibility was a relevant theme to all, but especially to
Shell, which as a first mover with a newly defined role, was
especially under scrutiny and challenged to nurture this
major asset (Worden 2003). Therefore, we saw credibility
as a passage point through which the other two strategies
with their sub-strategies—co-construction and influencing
the arenas—needed to be validated. That is, credibility was
itself seen as an asset to be nurtured, but it was also a type
of an indicator related to if, and to what extent, the
stakeholders accepted any moves from the side of Shell.
Thus, influencing the arenas and co-construction could
only be performed under company leadership if the others
perceived the company to be credible.
By credibility we mean the extent to which a company is
perceived to have the knowledge and the ability to fulfil its
claims and if it can be trusted or not (Newell and Goldsmith
2001). Credibility therefore lies in the eye of the beholder. In
order to be perceived as credible, the company needed to
translate words into deeds (Worden 2003). However, the
credible company also needs to have integrity and to have
and maintain strong core values with high standards of
operation (Waddock 2001). In this sense, acting with
stakeholders in ‘wicked’ issue settings cannot be mere public
relations exercises of a company. It implies that there is ‘a
judicious mix of candour, competence and performance’
(Higgins and Diffenbach 1989, p. 17). Credibility in the
Camisea case was always under potential threat. This was,
for example, true because contractors in the supply chain
might not support Shell’s approach to a sustainable project.
I think at the former stages you have the greatest
chance to influence and that is when you want to get
the criteria right. It is this criteria which becomes the
governing criteria throughout and were going to be
the criteria in the next phase when we actually built
the project—probably the most difficult phase on the
ground, but still the criteria were the same. And so if
we hadn’t had the criteria and the policies, there is no
way that we could have convinced the contractor
what he had to do. We had to have that. At that phase
I think the next real big phase is getting it done on the
ground so whenever we start doing something on the
ground you are delivering what you said you would
deliver. (Interview with A, March 1999)
To be perceived as credible, the company had to be
reliable at any time in the project’s duration, implying that
its personnel supported the commitments made, but also
that it could mobilize the external stakeholder environment
to the extent that its commitments were not endangered.
Shell found different answers to these challenges, which
can be understood to have been successful in the Camisea
case. First, very early on, the company decided to be open
and transparent in dealing with information and they also
acknowledged the concerns expressed by stakeholder
groups, and did not exclude any of them. This is illustrated
by a quote of an NGO:
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Well, there were several things. One is honesty. You
cannot hope to bring organizations like ours—and we’re
not the most aggressive—on board in a dialogue unless
perceived as being honest. Which means that you have
to overcome the natural reluctance to share information
that typically for these types of companies has been
confidential information because up until recently
environmental best practices and social best practices
had been viewed as giving the company a competitive
edge over other companies. We need to break down the
competitiveness and therefore be much more open and
forthcoming with information. And Shell tried that in a
very big way. (Interview with C, October 1999)
Credibility also meant to not only communicating suc-
cess, but also being honest about failures and mistakes, and
amending them as a consequence. Furthermore, it meant
that external parties were informed about company moves
and were able to understand them well.
Finally, it was also important for Shell to demarcate its
own role as opposed to the role of others involved, and to
communicate this clearly and openly to external parties as
highlighted by the quote below.
Provide a clear definition of the role and scope of
accountability of Shell and other interested parties in
the project including Perupetro and the Peruvian
Government. (written document)
Every participant had to understand its share of responsi-
bility. Putting this through was at times a challenge. Main-
taining credibility, with all its sub-strategies, is a vital activity
to keep a process going in which various stakeholders for
diverse reasons may not be able to contribute to their prede-
fined tasks. In the case of Camisea, which was closely related
to the development of the region, Shell was thrown into a
situation whereby it would potentially take over tasks that
should have been performed by others (e.g. the local gov-
ernment) and of contending with increasing critique towards
them for not being legitimately allowed to do so.
To summarise our idea regarding ‘open strategizing’: it
is our opinion that the essence of this type of strategizing is
that, instead of trying to dictate directly what people should
or should not do, one should try to follow a process of
logic, creating the conditions which enable interaction and
to encourage arrangements for coping with issues, acting as
a facilitator, coach and team player. This is a new mindset
that differentiates itself from a purely instrumental mana-
gerial logic.
Reflections
Shell had developed a successful scheme—‘open strate-
gizing’—in dealing with project-related challenges, a
scheme that can also form new theory building and new
modes of practice relating to stakeholders. This scheme
emphasizes the fact that stakeholder engagements, espe-
cially in the situation of a ‘wicked’ issue, evade a fully
ordered approach and call for dialogue, sense-making and a
more balanced stakeholder participation as well as gover-
nance mechanisms that help companies to successfully
navigate through challenges (e.g. Payne and Calton 2002).
Classical stakeholder theory comprises an abundance of
work that has a strong managerial focus and is built up on
the ground of what we called a ‘conventional steering
model’ (Savage et al. 1991). In this inside-out model,
complexity is reduced in favour of increased conceptual
clarity, however, at the cost of depicting the multiple
casualties and dynamics underlying stakeholder relations.
That is, we observe an inherent trade off between ‘clean’
theorizing versus dealing with paradoxical and complex
situations.
Taking a retrospective view of the company and what it
reported to have encountered in the Camisea case, we
found repeated expressions among their quotes such as ‘we
did not know the solutions’, ‘we did not have any prede-
fined management plan’, ‘it was not up to us to tell them—
the stakeholders—what to do’, etc. Yet, from the view of
the company as an efficiency-driven entity, they would
have required some sort of ordered approach. That is, Shell
was neither able to fully adhere to the wishes and concerns
of the groups nor could it just simply follow its own plans.
Thus, the pressure was always connected to prevent it
being perceived as operating from behind a fac¸ade,
resulting in the stakeholder environment judging the
company’s endeavours as non-authentic or losing itself in
dialogues while attempting to follow all of the interests of
the stakeholders concerned. We therefore discovered that
management did not follow a rigidly structured manage-
ment plan; central steering was not possible because the
tasks of governance were complex and difficult, and no
single organization could perform them all (Bryson and
Crosby 1992). Therefore, non-routine strategy-making
emerged as participants acted on the issues at hand.
Our approach assumes that dynamics are an integral part
of ‘wicked’ issue situations and thus there should also be a
theoretical body accounting for these dynamics. Hence, it
is impossible for a single organization to be in charge of the
substantive problems that require resolution. Furthermore,
a company cannot follow a rigidly structured planning
process that promises to be successful. In these environ-
ments, a single organization is hardly in a position to
determine outcomes and governance implies more than
this. In projects such as Camisea, leaders empower them-
selves and their stakeholders to associate with others in
dealing with their environments while sharing responsi-
bility. Leadership is about coping with informational
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richness, establishing rules for the game to which the
parties addressed can adhere, and about structuring a pro-
cess that permits self-governance and self-reliance. In order
to advance theorizing on stakeholders in such settings, it is
important that we understand more about the sense-making
activities of the parties and identify the other schemes for
dealing with ‘wicked’ issue situations which may occur on
the grounds of constructivist theories as mentioned above
(Nijhof and Jeurissen 2006; Pasquero 1996). These theories
open our eyes to new forms of engagement that develop in
the field.
Camisea as it was conducted by Shell offers a descrip-
tive account of business practices in a multinational con-
text. It is an example of how a corporation—among other
issues—was thrown into a situation in which it had to take
on new roles, among them administering to a certain
extent, citizenship rights that would have otherwise been
the original task of the national and local governments.
This of course raises to date unanswered questions of
legitimacy about such a newly adopted corporate role
(Matten and Crane 2005a; Scherer and Palazzo 2008).
More so, we find increasing critique that corporate social
responsibility initiatives may not only be ineffective in
reaching the desired positive impacts but, for example, may
even lead to more marginalized local communities and
destroyed environments (Sawyer and Terence Gomez
2008). This article has not addressed these critical issues in
depth, but it is our wish to highlight them and emphasize
the importance of defining new forms of stakeholder gov-
ernance that respect the question of legitimacy and the
political nature of business operations and ultimately lead
to true democratization. This is especially relevant with
regard to the fact that the Camisea project took a very
disadvantageous trajectory both for the communities and
for the environment after Shell had left. As projects as
Camisea are so huge in scale, they can develop a
momentum that can hardly be stopped once set off which
also became clear with the recent BP desaster. We should
not forget enforce our efforts for multi-disciplinary views
on stakeholder democracy and link them to the relevant
arenas for a sustainable development that deserves the
name (Blowfield and Frynas 2005; Frynas 2008; Idemudia
2009).
We believe ‘open strategizing’—and with it the theo-
retical body sustaining it—is especially important in trig-
gering new views regarding stakeholder practice and
theorizing. The approach cannot handle all the implications
a case such as Camisea would suggest in terms of fully
responding to the corporate social responsibility chal-
lenges. However, it can be the door-opener for more
innovative practices to occur as instrumental and man-
agement-driven approaches are too short-sighted for these
‘wicked’ issue situations. If true value creation is to take
place and companies are to play a role in actively partici-
pating in value creation, they need to understand the
underlying logic of such engagements, other than just
following a check-list style of establishing engagements.
‘Open strategizing’ highlights the capabilities that should
be developed on the company side.
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